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Abstract
Investigation of California Physician-Owned Hospitals Profitability and Payor Mix Compared to
Other Hospitals Over Time
By
James Pinder
Claremont Graduate University: 2020
Scrutiny of physician-owned hospitals (POHs) intensified beginning in 1989 and
continued until passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA).
Government studies attempted to better understand the allegations that POHs were exploiting the
whole hospital exception in the Stark laws by primarily accepting the healthiest patients with the
best insurance (cream skimming or cherry picking) while avoiding sicker, less well insured
patients.
The ACA prevented new POHs from opening and existing ones from expanding. With
California v. Texas being decided by the US Supreme Court in 2021, the ACA, including the
provisions regarding POHs, hangs in the balance. What has happened to POHs in California
since passage of the ACA? How do POHs compare to other hospitals in California?
Employing quantitative methods with data from California’s Office of Statewide Health
Planning and Development, POHs were compared to two other groups of hospitals: investorowned, and non-profit, using the metrics of net income margin percentage and low-reimbursing
insurance payor mix, for the time period 2009-2015.

The results indicate there are no statistically significant differences between POHs and
other hospitals ownership types when considering net income margin percentage. There are
statistically significant results between POHs and other hospital ownership groups in lowreimbursing insurance payor mix.
The conclusions from this study include a call to action for policymakers to consider the
value of POH restrictions regardless of the outcome in the US Supreme Court case California v.
Texas.
Keywords: hospital, physician owned, specialty, health services, affordable care act,
supreme court
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Chapter 1: Overview of this Study
Prior to passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA), it was
alleged that physician-owned hospitals (POHs) were operating in ways that were unfair to other
hospitals. Opponents claimed they cream skimmed patients (only accepting the ones with the
best insurance, or ones that were the healthiest). Physician self-referral occurs when a physician
refers their own patient for additional care or services to a business entity in which they have
financial ownership or interest. The logic was that if physicians were self-referring, they would
only accept the most lucrative patients and avoid the ones with lower reimbursing or no
insurance. They might also prefer to choose the patients that were relatively healthy and avoid
the sicker ones. It was alleged that physicians who self-refer would benefit unfairly from this
practice. It was also alleged that physicians would order unnecessary tests to build up the
reimbursement in a fee-for-service payment model. As physician owners, greater reimbursement
from insurance means increased profits for the hospital and their owners. The studies by the
government and others look carefully at these allegations and will be discussed later in the
literature review.
One small provision of the ACA was designed to halt the opening of new physicianowned hospitals (POHs) or expansion of existing POHs. The logic was that POHs were harmful
and unfair to other hospitals and the healthcare system and this harm needed to be mitigated.
Since 2010, when the ACA was passed, no known new POHs have been opened or expanded in
compliance with the ACA.
The literature review will describe how POHs are similar and different from other
hospitals. Hospitals provide different types of services and attract different patient populations
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who have various types of health insurance. Hospitals also perform at different financial levels
and have different ownership structures, which affect how they operate.
The purpose of this study is to address some of the allegations regarding POHs. POHs
will be compared to other hospitals in California to discern if they have a different patient
insurance mix and a different level of profitability from 2009-2015. This encompasses the preand post-ACA time periods. While many provisions of the ACA were implemented in stages
after President Obama signed it in March 2010, the portions affecting POHs became effective in
March 2010 for existing POHs and December 2010 for those under construction (Cole, 2013).
POHs will be compared to two other groups of hospitals: investor-owned hospitals, and nonprofit hospitals. Non-profit hospitals include government operated hospitals (district, county,
and state hospitals). Both government and non-profit hospitals serve the community without
having a profit motivation. Many government hospitals are classified as safety-net and receive a
significant amount of their reimbursement from Medi-Cal. They rely on public subsidies such as
Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital payments (DSH). However, the services they offer are
similar to other hospitals. Investor-owned hospitals are a logical comparison group because their
profit motives are the same as POHs. Non-profit hospitals are also a suitable comparison group
because it encompasses all the other hospitals that are not investor-owned.
In addition to comparing POHs to other groups of hospitals, individual groups of
hospitals were analyzed over time to show trends of how various types of hospitals changed from
2009 to 2015. For instance, POHs profit margins were analyzed over time to determine if they
had grown weaker, stayed the same, or grown stronger over time. This was done for non-profit
hospitals and investor-owned hospitals.
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In other studies that were national in scope or specific to one state, POHs have been
compared to other hospitals at a specific point in time or for specific disease states (Plummer
2016). Other studies have analyzed patient payor mix as it relates to Medicare or Medicaid, but
not the entire basket of insurance types (Blumenthal, 2015). The other studies have not
considered the phenomenon of payor mix and profit margin over time, using specific metrics of
payor mix and profit margin. The purpose of this study is to describe the characteristics of POHs
in California, to empirically assess the patient payor mix, and to analyze the profit margin of
POHs compared to other hospitals in California for the period of 2009-2015.
Significance and Timeliness of this Study
This study can help guide policymakers as they decide how to proceed if the ACA is
dismantled by the Supreme Court. Should the ACA’s provisions affecting POHs be rendered
mute, politicians will be bombarded by lobbyists seeking to protect their clients and advance
specific agendas. It would seem likely that trade organizations representing acute care hospitals,
investor-owned hospitals, and physician-owned hospitals would see opportunities and threats.
Politicians would be wise to seek unbiased research, policy briefs, and data from sources that can
help them decide what is best for healthcare consumers, not just healthcare providers.
The United States Supreme Court has accepted the case challenging the ACA (see
literature review), a decision will be reached by 2021. This study will investigate POHs in
California from 2009-2015. When subsequent data is released by OSHPD, similar research
methods can be employed to update the findings.
Should the Supreme Court’s decision in 2021 not affect the operations of POHs and leave
intact the existing regulations, this study can help policymakers better understand how POHs fit
into the California healthcare system. Attempts by those wanting to relax regulations on POHs
3

will need to be answered. Having a clearer understanding of POHs in California and how they
relate to other hospitals will allow policymakers to make better informed decisions.

4

Chapter 2: Literature Review
The literature review begins with a description of hospital characteristics in the United
States. It describes the types of hospitals available to patients by the services they provide and
their ownership structures. This review also shows trend data on the number of hospitals in the
United States. Hospitals receive reimbursement from different types of insurance. This data is
presented over a period to show the trend. Hospitals must remain solvent to stay operational.
This data is presented for similar period as the insurance reimbursement data. The literature
review continues with a definition of POHs, how are they different from many other hospitals,
and how they are similar.
The literature review presents, in chronological order, the allegations, political
background, government studies, legislation, regulation, and lawsuits pertaining to POHs in the
United States. From the studies that were conducted by the government and non-governmental
entities, we will learn what was discovered about POHs and what remains unknown. Two major
studies are presented along with a systematic review.
Hospitals in the United States
Hospitals in the United States can be described by the services they provide. There are
two main categories: general and specialty. General hospitals provide a wide range of services to
their patients including surgical procedures and general medical procedures and care. Specialty
hospitals focus on one disease state or process, such as cardiac, orthopedic, or psychiatric care
(McCarthy, 2012).
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The number of hospitals in the United States, as described in Table 1, has steadily
increased from 2009 to 2017 (Elflein, 2019).
Table 1
Number of Hospitals in the United States by Ownership Type 2009 to 2017
2009
State/local government 1,092
Non-profit
2,918
For-profit
998
Total 5,008

2010
1,068
2,904
1,013
4,985

2011
1,045
2,903
1,025
4,973

2012
1,037
2,894
1,068
4,999

2013
1,010
2,904
1,060
4,974

2014
1,003
2,870
1,053
4,926

2015
983
2,845
1,034
4,862

2016
956
2,849
1,035
4,840

2017
972
2,968
1,322
5,262

Hospitals can also be described by their ownership structure. Federal hospitals are
operated and regulated by the federal government under the supervision of the Department of
Health and Human Services, Veterans Health Administration, and the Department of Defense
(Liu, 2018). There are nonfederal government hospitals that are operated by city, state, or county
governments. California has an additional type of nonfederal government hospital called
hospital districts. These are a form of local government control of hospitals (Taylor, 2006).
Among the nongovernment hospitals, there are two types: non-profit and investor-owned (forprofit). The biggest difference between these two types is what they do with their profits. Nonprofit hospitals reinvest the funds into their own infrastructure. For-profit hospitals do the same
and pay dividends to shareholders (McCarthy, 2012).
Hospitals can also be categorized by who can gain access to them. Community hospitals
are open to the public while non-community hospitals are only accessible to certain populations
of individuals. An example would be Veterans Administration hospitals, which are only open to
members of the military and their families. Community hospitals make up 85% of hospitals in
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the United States and can include hospitals that specialize in specific kinds of care such as for
children or rehabilitation (Shi, 2019).
Finally, hospitals can be categorized as teaching and non-teaching. A teaching hospital is
one that is a training facility for medical students and medical residents. It can be a non-profit,
for-profit, or government operated. To further designate a teaching hospital that has a medical
school, hospital, and university associated with it, the term academic medical center is applied
(Shi, 2019).
Hospitals in the United States earn most of their revenue from health insurance payments
provided for treating patients. Different insurance types reimburse at different rates for the same
services. The highest reimbursing insurance is private coverage, which is greater than Medicare
(Masterson, 2017). The poorest reimbursing insurance is Medi-Cal, or Medicaid (Mcaskill,
2014). The combination of insurance types is known as the payor mix. This mix of patients with
their associated insurance types can affect the profitability of a hospital. Later in the literature
review, the results of POHs attempting to operate without accepting Medicare or Medicaid are
presented. Trend data for payor mix in the United States indicates a trend of more patients
having Medicare and Medicaid insurance, while private insurance is decreasing (AHA, 2016).
This data, from the American Hospital Association (2016), described the payor mix of hospitals
in the United States from 1980 to 2014. It is clear from this data (in Table 2) that Medicare and
private insurance are a vital part of a hospital’s payor mix as they represent most of the payor
mix for any given year.

7

Table 2
Payor Mix Percentage of All Hospitals 1980, 2000, 2014
Medicare Medicaid Other Government
1980 34.60
9.60
6.10
2000 38.30
12.80
1.40
2014 40.20
17.60
1.70

Private
41.80
38.70
33.10

Uncompensated Non-patient
5.10
2.70
6.00
2.80
5.30
2.10

The ability of a hospital to stay operational is determined by its profit margin. It does not
matter if a hospital is a non-profit, for-profit, government operated, community, or noncommunity hospital, it must bring in more money than it spends to take care of its patients. In
the United States, profit margins for all hospitals has generally trended up from 3.6% in 1981 to
4.6% in 2000, and up to 8.3% in 2014 (Belk, 2020).
The definition of a physician-owned hospital is one where a physician has any amount of
an ownership stake or investment interest. This does not include a physician owning shares of a
hospital corporation that is publicly traded. POHs are in some ways no different from other
hospitals, but in other ways they are very different. While they are permitted to provide the same
services as other hospitals, many choose not to provide a comprehensive list of services (such as
general hospitals). There are exceptions of course, but many have chosen to specialize in
specific procedures (orthopedic or cardiovascular). POHs are investor-owned (for profit). At
times they are entirely owned by physicians or they can be a collaboration between physicians
and another group (either a non-profit or for-profit entity).
The literature does not specify which hospitals in the United States or California are
POHs. Previous studies have used different methods to identify them. The method for identifying
POHs are outlined later in this study.
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Legal, Regulatory, Political History, and Studies of POHs: 1989 to 2010
Concern in the 1980s grew that physicians were making money at the cost of government
and taxpayers, in an unfair manner through the practice of self-referral (OIG, 1989). The federal
government conducted a series of studies, starting in 1989 on various aspects of POHs. The first,
by The Office of Inspector General found that when a physician had an ownership in an
independent clinical lab, their patients received 34% more services from the clinical lab
compared to other Medicare patients (OIG, 1989). These findings confirmed that physicians
benefited financially from self-referring to their own clinical labs. The results were an extra $28
million in Medicare spending in 1987. Congress reacted with a new law referred to as Stark I in
1989 (taking effect in 1992). Physicians were prohibited from referring their own patients to
clinical labs in which they had an ownership interest. The goal was to prevent unnecessary
billing to Medicare, and waste of taxpayer money.
The study conducted by the Office of Inspector General used claims data to determine
referral patterns and their associated costs. This was one of the first attempts to determine if selfreferral was causing undue expense for the government and taxpayers. While the amount of
money that was deemed to have been wasted ($28 million) seems paltry in today’s dollars, it
pointed the finger at an unfairness in the US healthcare system. It looked like physicians were
gaming the system at the expense of the rest of the country.
The Office of the Inspector General also fielded two surveys. One survey went to
physicians and one went to providers of Medicare Part B ancillary services. Approximately 50%
of the claims for these services from 1986 were included. The response rates from physicians
and service providers were very high, over 95%. The survey sample and response rates indicate
a solid study design with good internal validity.
9

The Stark Laws (1990 and 1993) and their associated regulations continued to expand
(Manchikanti, 2007). An exception to all these prohibitions is allowing physicians to have an
ownership in the entire hospital, as opposed to ownership of a subdivision of the hospital (such
as the clinical lab). This is known as the whole hospital exception. The assumption was that
ownership in the entire facility (such as owning shares of an investor-owned hospital) would be
diluted enough that self-referral would not be a significant conflict of interest or financial drain
on the system. Even if a physician referred their patient to a hospital in which the physician
owned shares, it would not significantly benefit the physician financially. This makes sense if
one is considering a large comprehensive hospital that offers many levels of service. The
outcome can change when one considers a physician referring a patient to a small specialty
hospital in which the physician has an ownership stake.
Specialty hospitals usually treat only one or two specific conditions (cardiac and
orthopedic specialties are very common). By 2003 there were growing concerns that the Stark
Laws left a gap that allowed for physician-owned specialty hospitals to exist and drain the
system of needed resources while enriching their physician owners. There were also concerns
that these physician-owned specialty hospitals financially harmed other hospitals in the
community by cherry picking (cream skimming) the patients that were the healthiest and most
well insured.
The federal government studied the issue and found that since 1990 the number of
specialty hospitals had tripled, yet they occupied only 2% of the market (GAO, 2003). This
accounted for 1% of Medicare spending. They also found that 70% of specialty hospitals had
physician ownership and tended to treat fewer sick patients compared to other community
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hospitals. The study was not able to determine if treating fewer sick patients had a clinical or
economic impact.
This study included 110 specialty hospitals divided into four categories. The hospitals
were surveyed, and claims data was collected from the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project
data set to determine the severity of the patients being treated. The survey response rate was
approximately 80%. This study represents a good combination of sample size and response rate.
Because the study did not determine the clinical or economic impact of surgical hospitals, which
treat fewer sick patients compared to other acute care hospitals, it is difficult to determine if the
findings are actionable.
In 2003, Congress passed the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act (Congress, 2003). It included provisions related to physician-owned hospitals
that placed an 18-month moratorium on a physician’s ability to refer to a new specialty hospital
in which they had an investment or ownership interest. Existing specialty hospitals were
exempted. This effectively stopped opening new physician-owned hospitals until June 2005.
The day after the ban expired, CMS suspended enrolling new physician-owned specialty
hospitals until August 2006 (Levinson, 2008) as part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005.
The law also contained language which required a study by the Medicare Payment Advisory
Commission (MedPAC) to study physician-owned specialty hospitals compared to local fullservice community hospitals. The report was due to Congress in 2005. MedPAC was charged
with studying the following aspects:
1. Referral patterns of specialty hospital owners
2. Quality of care and patient satisfaction
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3. Differences in uncompensated care
4. Relative value of tax exemptions available to community hospitals
From 67 physician-owned specialty hospitals, MedPAC chose 11 for their sample. They
compared them with competitor academic medical centers and community hospitals that were no
more than 20 miles away (comparison group). Many leaders at these hospitals were interviewed
to triangulate the data. Historical data was also collected from the Internal Revenue Service and
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. And finally, patients were interviewed to assess
satisfaction (Leavitt, 2005).
The study found that specialty hospital physician owners referred to their own facilities at a
high rate. This is considered normal because physicians tend to refer most of their patients to a
single facility, even if it is an academic medical center or a community hospital. The study also
found that physician-owned specialty hospitals provide a high level of quality care when
considering readmission rates, complication rates, and mortality rates (Leavitt, 2005). For
example, the study calculated inpatient quality indicators for four specific procedures: abdominal
aortic aneurysm repair, coronary artery by-pass graft, Percutaneous Transluminal Coronary
Angioplasty, and carotid endarterectomy. The observed/expected mortality rates were less than
one, which indicates good outcomes. The mortality rates of specialty hospitals compared to their
competitors also showed observed/expected ratios of less than one. Physician-owned hospitals
provide quality care to their patients.
The topic of uncompensated care was challenging because community hospital leaders
argued they took care of the least-insured patients (Leavitt, 2005). MedPAC determined that the
amount of money paid in taxes by physician-owned specialty hospitals exceeded the value of
uncompensated care provided by other hospitals. Using the value of uncompensated care among
12

non-profit hospitals compared to the community benefit (taxes paid) by specialty hospitals, the
study found that not-for profits provided uncompensated care at the rate of 0.87% compared to a
net community benefit of 3.74% for cardiac hospitals and 7.23% for orthopedic/surgery hospitals
(Leavitt, 2005). This showed that physician-owned hospitals were not a drain on community
resources, but an asset.
Looking at the study, the challenge MedPAC had with studying physician-owned
hospitals remains today. Who and where are the physician-owned hospitals? The organization,
Physician Hospitals of America, does not share its membership list with the public. If one were
to join their organization, the membership list would be available. However, it only lists the
hospitals that have joined, not an exhaustive list. Thus, MedPAC did their best to identify a
comprehensive list of physician-owned hospitals from which to choose a sample. The number of
hospitals selected was geographically diverse but small. From 67 POHs, they studied 11
hospitals. This is a very small sample size and is most valuable as a series of case study
examples. This study does not seem adequate to provide actionable data for Congress because of
the small sample size. However, when combined with the previous government studies, it
helped paint a picture from which Congress could act.
In 2006 the Office of Inspector General conducted a survey of community hospitals to
determine how they were reacting to the presence of a specialty hospital in their regions
(Steinwald, 2006). They surveyed 600 hospitals (some had a specialty hospital in their market,
and some did not) and 401 responded. It was thought that community hospitals with a specialty
hospital in their market might be making competitive responses as a result (Steinwald, 2006).
All responding hospitals were making changes to their services to remain competitive. There
was little data to suggest specialty hospitals influenced these competitive changes. This study
13

was broader and shallower compared to the MedPAC study but had important findings. Were
community hospital leaders worried about POHs to the degree that they would make market
moves? It appears the answer is no.
The presence of specialty hospitals encourages other general acute care hospitals to
become more efficient and competitive (Steinwald, 2006). More competition is generally better
for patients and payors in many areas of business. This study concluded that while general acute
care hospitals (both rural and urban) were making a lot of changes to remain competitive, none
of them appeared to be related to the presence of specialty hospitals (Steinwald, 2006).
The 2006 OIG study concluded that specialty hospitals occupy a small part of the
marketplace and that they do not have a large impact on healthcare markets either negative or
positive. This result makes specialty hospitals appear to be benign and less threatening. While it
does not justify expanding the presence of specialty hospitals it should not prevent it either.
Physician-owned specialty hospitals face challenges in managing medical emergencies
(Levinson, 2008). While there was not concern about the quality of medical care in these
facilities when it came to procedures (according to the MedPAC study), when two patients died
after routine procedures, notice was taken by the federal government (Levinson, 2008). In both
cases the physician-owned hospitals called 9-1-1 and the patients were sent to community
hospitals, where they were pronounced dead. In January 2008, the Inspector General released a
report on this topic.
The Office of Inspector General’s findings are quoted below:
1. “About half of all physician-owned specialty hospitals have emergency departments, the
majority of which have only one emergency bed.”
14

2. “Not all physician-owned specialty hospitals had nurses on duty and physicians on
call…”
3. “…less than one-third of physician-owned specialty hospitals have physicians onsite at
all times.”
4. “Two-thirds of physician-owned specialty hospitals use 9-1-1 as part of their emergency
response procedures.”
This study was conducted from a potential list of 130 POHs. From this list, the Office of
Inspector General narrowed it down to 109 hospitals that met their definition of having one
physician owner. Each of these hospitals were surveyed on their staffing levels based on eight
selected days. Hospitals administrators were also surveyed by telephone. There was a 100%
response rate to these surveys and the telephone interview. This study suffered from the same
challenge that affects all such studies: no comprehensive list of POHs exists.
A series of recommendations were made to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS)
relating to the need for physician-owned hospitals to be identified and tracked, have a nurse on
duty at all times, a physician on-call at all times, and have procedures that don’t rely on calling
9-1-1 in case of an emergency.
This study mentioned an ongoing challenge that is still faced today: no one knows exactly
who and where the physician-owned hospitals are located. CMS does not track this information.
In California, the California Hospital Association and California Department of Public Health do
not track this information either.
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Legal, Regulatory, Political History, and studies of POHs: 2010 to Present
When the Affordable Care Act (ACA) passed Congress and became effective (Strokoff,
2010), it was heralded by some and loathed by others. Of little notice to most healthcare
consumers was the restriction placed on physician-owned hospitals. The ACA forbade new
POHs from billing Medicare. Medicare billing is the lifeblood of a hospital. While private
insurance reimburses at a higher rate than all other insurance types, many patients have Medicare
and hospitals rely on these revenue streams to survive. Several POHs opened after 2010 in
Texas, not accepting Medicare reimbursement, and they have either failed or were in the process
of failing (Plummer, 2016). The ACA was designed to reduce self-referral, cherry picking (or
cream skimming), and failure to provide community benefits by POHs.
It is interesting to note that physician-owned hospitals were not completely banned.
Their alleged bad behavior could continue, but the impact would be blunted. They could remain
competitive in the marketplace by offering new services, changing their business model (selling
their business), but they could not expand. There was a way to obtain permission for expansion
that will be discussed later.
In the ACA’s 974 pages, one of controversial section dealt with the requirement to
purchase health insurance known as the individual mandate (Internal Revenue Service, 2012).
With limited exceptions, taxpayers had to purchase health coverage or face a penalty. If
everyone is required to purchase health insurance, the risk is spread out and adverse selection is
minimized. Adverse selection is where only sick people purchase health insurance because they
know they need it. The younger, healthier population avoids purchasing health insurance
because they do not think they will need it. If only the sick patients have health insurance, it
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becomes very expensive. This concept of a penalty for failure to purchase health insurance
became the focal point of the first case to be heard by the Supreme Court on this legislation.
The government argued that they were justified in assessing a penalty (through IRS
regulations) for failing to purchase health insurance under the interstate commerce clause of the
US Constitution. The outcome was a win for the government, but a rejection of their argument
(Liptak, 2012). In the 5-4 decision, with the swing vote being Chief Justice John Roberts, it was
determined that the actions of the government were lawful, but that it was not a penalty or fee
but a tax. And Congress has the authority to levy taxes so the critical component of the ACA,
the individual mandate, stood firm.
Since passage of the Affordable Care Act, there have been several non-governmental
studies of POHs. Two of the studies will be presented along with a systematic review of 46
studies. One study was national, the other focused on a single state. Earlier in this literature
review several governmental studies were presented and discussed. These were instrumental in
POHs restrictions being placed in the Affordable Care Act. The studies were published in 2014,
2015 and 2016 and paint a picture of POHs after passage and implementation of the ACA. After
presenting the three studies, the literature review will continue with the legal challenges to the
ACA.
The national study from 2015 is titled “Access, quality, and costs of care at physician
owned hospitals in the United States: observational study” (Blumenthal, 2015). It was a large
observational study consisting of 219 POHs and 1967 other hospitals. This sample was close to
being a census as it contained nearly a comprehensive list of hospitals spread across 95 referral
regions. The study, from 2010, compared POHs to other hospitals, along the patient dimensions
of Medicaid status and race/ethnicity as well as hospital performance, readmission rates, the cost
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of care, Medicare market share, and 30-day mortality rate. The statistical tests used were chisquare, independent samples t-test, and linear regression models.
This study at whether POHs were cherry picking (cream skimming) the most wellinsured or healthiest patients while avoiding those that were poorly insured or sicker. While it is
true that a well-insured patient may be very sick, or a healthy patient may be poorly insured, the
concept of cherry picking and cream skimming refers to the allegation that a POH would seek
the greatest reimbursement (well insured patients) or the best outcomes (healthiest patients)
patients at the expense of those that are sicker or poorly insured. The allegation also means that
POHs would avoid patients that are likely to produce less desirable outcomes or not maximize
reimbursement. This study also investigated if there were racial or ethnic disparities of the
patients between POHs and other acute care hospitals, and if there were increased utilization
rates with POHs hospitals. POHs were alleged to be ordering tests or procedures that were
unnecessary and increased reimbursement at the expense of taxpayers (OIG, 1989). Their
sources of data were Physician Hospitals of America, The American Hospital Association, and
Medicare claims data.
The conclusions of this study were that POHs did treat slightly healthier patients. The
number of patient comorbidities was 1.6 for POHs and 1.8 for non-POHs (Blumenthal, 2015).
The study found that POHs did not avoid patients with low-paying insurance (Medicaid). The
percentage of POHs patients with Medicaid was 14.9% compared to 15.4% for non-POHs
(Blumenthal, 2015). And POHs did not shun patients from ethnic or racial minority groups.
POHs patients were 5.1% black compared to 5.5% black for non-POHs (Blumenthal, 2015). The
quality of care between the two groups of hospital were very similar. POHs patient experience
scores were 74.3% compared to 74.9% for non-POHs. And the mortality rates were within 0.1%
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of each other. The differences between POHs and other hospitals were small. This study
recommended that restrictions on POHs be re-evaluated to see if they are still necessary because
the allegations against POHs appeared to be overblown (Blumenthal, 2015) as they may not be
necessary.
This study appears to be generalizable to hospitals across the United States because the
sample was taken from across the entire country and includes almost all acute care hospitals,
surgical hospitals, and POHs. It answers the major questions brought forward by the authors of
the Affordable Care Act relating to POHs cherry picking (cream skimming) the best patients at
the expense of other hospitals.
In this study, they weighted their linear regression models for discharges, hospital size,
referral region, geographic setting, profit status, and teaching status. This helped isolate the
relationships between the independent and dependent variables (Blumenthal, 2015).
The second study focused on Texas and was titled “The Affordable Care Act’s Effects on
the Formation, Expansion, And Operation of Physician-Owned Hospitals” (Plummer, 2016). It
analyzed hospitals’ response to implementation of the Affordable Care Act and afterward. The
sample consisted of 106 POHs and were compared to 163 for-profit (non-physician owned)
hospitals. This sample was close to a census of POHs and investor-owned hospitals in Texas. It
is not clear how so many POHs were identified for this study. Using other for-profit hospitals as
a comparison group made sense because both groups were profit-seeking and would have similar
business motivations. This study estimated there were 240-275 POHs in the United States.
Texas has a very large number of POHs, and this sample represents about 40% of POHs across
the nation (Plummer, 2016). The empirical methods of this observational study included
independent samples t-test and linear regression models. It analyzed various metrics for
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profitability. The Plummer study also considered the use of assets such as number of surgeries
per operating room and revenue per square foot or full-time equivalent employee. This data was
analyzed for the time period 2008-2012, representing the pre- and post-ACA time periods.
In 2010, prior to the deadline for new POHs to open and avoid the ACA restrictions, 20
new POHs opened in Texas (Plummer, 2016). This is compared to 63 opening in the period of
2004-2009. What happens if a new POH opens after 2010 and does not accept Medicare or
Medicaid? The answer is a disaster for those institutions. From 2011-2013, nine POHs formed
in Texas and did not accept Medicare or Medicaid. All have either been sold or were in
bankruptcy when this study was published (Plummer, 2016). The study concludes that the
Affordable Care Act was successful in its goals of stopping the formation of new POHs or
allowing existing ones to expand. The study shows that POHs in Texas that were opened prior to
passage of the ACA were able to survive, and thrive, even with the restrictions placed on them
by the Affordable Care Act. Net mean revenue per adjusted patient day for POHs was $2,710,
compared to $1,201 for non-POHs (Plummer, 2016).
This study is not generalizable to the entire United States because the sample included
only hospitals in Texas. The methods were rigorous and included variables in the regressions to
account for between-same differences including size (log of admissions), accountable care
organization participation, and designation of a specialty hospital. This helped isolate the
relationships between the independent and dependent variables (Plummer, 2016).
The systematic review analyzed 46 studies, using the metrics of care from the Institute of
Medicine’s quality framework. They concluded that limited evidence existed to support the
concept that POHs provided advantages, or that POHs impacted other hospitals in a negative
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way (Trybou, 2014). They recommended that POHs continue to be monitored because the
evidence they found was not consistent or cohesive.
When Donald Trump became President, he began an effort to repeal and replace the
ACA. Progress came with passage of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (Congress, 2017). One
provision of this new law reduced the penalty of the individual mandate to $0. This law set in
motion the judicial proceedings that threaten to undo the ACA in its entirety.
Texas and other plaintiffs brought an action against the government arguing that with
passage of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, with the individual mandate tax being reduced to
$0, the individual mandate is unconstitutional both under the interstate commerce clause of the
Constitution and Congress’ authority to tax (O’Connor, 2018). The plaintiffs also argued that if
the individual mandate were unconstitutional, it was not severable from the remainder of the law
and thus the entire ACA should be unconstitutional. Justice O’Conner agreed with the plaintiffs
and ruled that the individual mandate was unconstitutional and further that it was inseverable
from the rest of the ACA. Thus, the entire law was unconstitutional.
Not much was made of this district court ruling as the outcome would be appealed and
decided by the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals. This new case was more important because its
decision could be appealed to the Supreme Court. The outcome surprised people on both sides
of the isle (Yood, 2019). It was determined in a split decision that the individual mandate was
unconstitutional (King, 2020). The portion legal experts wanted to know was whether it was
severable from the remainder of the law. The 5th Circuit Court of Appeals sent the case back to
the District Court for reconsideration. This made little sense as the appeals court could, and
probably should have made that decision. The District Court will likely come to the same
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conclusion they did originally, as the same judge is presiding. It is likely this case will still end
up before the Supreme Court, but it will take longer than originally imagined.
If the Supreme Court ruled that the individual mandate is not severable, and the entire
ACA falls, one portion of interest to this study is the prohibition on new POHs and the expansion
of existing POHs found in section 6001 of the Compilation of Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (Strokoff, 2010). What should happen to physician-owned hospitals should the entire
ACA be deemed unconstitutional?
The case took a turn in March 2020 when the Supreme Court agreed to hear it, prior to
the District Court being able to review what was returned to them by the 5th Circuit Court of
Appeals. The State of California and the US House of Representatives intervened on behalf of
the Affordable Care Act because the federal government was not defending it (Musumeci, 2020).
The 5th Circuit Court of Appeals accepted their application for intervenor status. The intervenors
appealed to the Supreme Court for expedited processing but was denied. They argued that the
impact and uncertainty to the healthcare of Americans in this case necessitated that the case be
heard this term. However, the case was accepted by the Supreme Court for the following term
and oral arguments were heard November 10, 2020. It will not be decided until 2021. Because
of the intervenor status of California (and several other Democratic states), the case has been
consolidated and is now called California v. Texas (Howe, 2020).
Charity Care
Charity care (a component of community benefit), which is required of non-profit
hospitals by the ACA, has become a topic of interest to researchers. On a national scale, top
earning non-profit hospitals provide less charity care than lower earning non-profit hospitals.
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“…the top-earning quartile gave $11.50 of charity to uninsured patients and $5.10 to insured
patients for every $100 of net income. In comparison, non-profit hospitals in the third quartile of
income gave $72.30 of charity to the uninsured and $40.90 to the insured for every $100 of net
income” (LaPointe, 2020).
In California, charity care has plunged from 2013 to 2015, likely because of
implementation of the ACA in 2014 requiring everyone to have health insurance. The rate of
charity care among all California hospitals dropped from just over 2% to just under 1% (Rowan,
2019). Because charity care is required of non-profit hospitals, it is not a dependent variable
when comparing POHs to non-profit institutions.
Similarities with Other Studies and Uniqueness of this Study
The proposed study is like Blumenthal (2015) in that it is observational and contains
nearly a census of hospitals. Blumenthal’s sample came from across the United States, while
this study is limited to California. The statistical tests to be run are also similar in the use of
independent samples t-test and linear regression models. While Blumenthal focused on 2010, the
proposed study encompasses data from 2009-2015.
This study is also like the research conducted in Texas (Plummer, 2016) in that it
contains nearly a census of hospitals. The Texas research only focused on POH and investorowned hospitals, while this study will include non-profit and government hospitals from
California. Plummer (2016) used data from 2008-2012, a five-year span that is equally prior to
and after the ACA was implemented in 2010. The proposed study encompasses a five-year
timeframe as well but starts just prior to 2010 and stretches further past the ACA implementation
in 2010.
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While other studies in the literature review analyzed the phenomenon of cherry picking
(cream skimming) by looking at POHs avoiding Medicaid patients or choosing healthier patients
(Blumenthal, 2015), none have analyzed the entire basket of insurance options. This study seeks
to clarify this question by considering nine types of insurance, broken into two categories (highand low-reimbursing). Blumenthal (2015) only looked at data for a single year while Plummer
(2016) analyzed data over a five-year period. The proposed study strengthens the Plummer
approach by introducing statistical analysis that looks for relationships between the hospital
groups with time as a factor. None of the other studies attempted this approach. Studying the
dependent variables individually, and over time, adds to the knowledge about POHs and gives
policymakers a clearer picture of these phenomenon in California.
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Chapter 3: Methods
Research Questions
After reviewing the literature, the principal objective of this study is to assess what has
been the effect of the ACA on California POHs? What has happened to California physicianowned hospitals from 2009-2015 (the period right before and several years after
passage/implementation of the ACA)? The following two questions each contain two items.
These questions address the main reasons the ACA contained provisions relating to POHs and
their associated restrictions. By answering these questions, conclusions can be drawn regarding
the need for further or continued regulation of POHs whether or not the ACA is dismantled by
the US Supreme Court. The conclusions can also assist policymakers in future discussions about
POHs should the US Supreme court not dismantle the ACA. Should the Supreme Court’s
decision in 2021 not affect the operations of POHs and leave intact the existing regulations, this
study can help policymakers better understand how POHs fit into the California healthcare
system. Attempts by those wanting to relax regulations on POHs will need to be answered.
Having a clearer understanding of POHs in California and how they relate to other hospitals will
allow policymakers to make better informed decisions.
1. Are physician-owned hospitals profit margins different than other hospitals? How have
POHs profited over time compared to other hospitals?
2. Are physician-owned hospitals’ payor mix different than other hospitals? How have
physician-owned hospitals’ payor mix changed over time compared to other hospitals?
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Research Objectives
The aim of this study is to investigate California Physician-Owned Hospitals profitability and
insurance mix compared to other hospitals and to evaluate how these variables have changed
over time. The specific objectives of the study are:
1. Describe the characteristics of hospitals in California
2. Empirically assess the profitability of physician-owned hospitals compared to other
hospitals in California for each year and over time.
3. Evaluate the payor mix of physician-owned hospitals compared to other hospitals in
California for each year and over time.
Sample
Data was downloaded from the Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development
website in the form of Excel spreadsheets for the years 2009-2015. This data categorized
hospitals as non-profit, investor-owned, or government. The umbrella term investor-owned
contains both POHs and other for-profit hospitals. Hospitals were coded with identifiers so they
could be sorted by ownership type. The number of POHs in California compared to all other
hospitals in California is not a published list or statistic. By analyzing and researching all
investor-owned hospitals, it is estimated a high proportion of POHs have been identified. It is
possible some POHs remain unidentified and would thus remain in the pool of investor-owned
hospitals. From 2009 to 2015, there were approximately 530 hospitals in California. There were
between eight and 11 POHs. It is possible some hospitals did not submit data to OSHPD. If this
is true, these hospitals will not be included in the study.
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From the OSHPD data (2020), many variables were available. Variables were selected or
rejected based on the literature review, to avoid redundancy, and to minimize collinearity. A
comprehensive list of available variables is listed in Appendix A, their type, and whether their
values were available or computed. Table 3 lists the variables that were selected for this study.
Table 3
List of Variables Used in this Study
Variable
Hospital Owneship Type
Teaching Status
Low-Reimbursing Insurance Payor Mix
Licensed Beds
Licensed Beds Occupancy Rate
Average Length of Stay
Net Income Margin
Charity % of Operating Exp

Type
Available or Computed
Categorical
Available
Categorical
Available
Continuous
Computed
Continuous
Available
Continuous
Available
Continuous
Available
Continuous
Available
Continuous
Available

The data was combined and organized so it could be analyzed with Statistical Package for
Social Sciences (SPSS) version 25 and Stata version 15. To prepare the data for analysis, it was
first checked for alignment to ensure the importation process was done successfully. Next, the
variables used in this study were checked for their correct coding. If a variable was dichotomous
or categorical, the type was set to string and the measure set to nominal. If it was continuous, the
type was set to numeric/percentage, and the measure set to scale. Data cleaning involved
identifying data entry errors such as a negative number of hospital beds. These values were
removed. To check for outliers, frequencies were computed with box plots. If outliers were
determined to be legitimate observations, they were included. If they were not legitimate
observations (data entry errors), they were removed. In the process of standardizing the
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coefficients in the random effects regression models, the hospitals with missing data were
removed for those specific calculations.
Skewness was checked by analyzing the data for each variable. The skewness scores for the
variables ranged from normally distributed (-0.5 to +0.5), moderately skewed (-1 to +1), to
highly skewed (< -1, > +1). To improve the results, non-parametric tests were conducted and
compared to parametric tests. The one-way between groups ANOVA (Tables 5, 9) and KruskalWallis H Test (Appendix C) results are very similar. Because the non-parametric tests did not
improve the results, parametric tests were used in this study.
For the fixed effects regression models (see below), the data was organized in a vertical
format as a panel (Andreb, 2017) and analyzed with Stata. A vertical format means the 2009
data was placed on the spreadsheet first, and subsequent year’s data was placed underneath in
order by year. To navigate through the data, one would scroll down or up, in a vertical fashion.
For all the remaining statistical analysis, the data was organized in a horizontal format and
analyzed with SPSS. A horizontal format means the 2009 data is place on the spreadsheet first,
and subsequent year’s data is placed to the right in order by year. To navigate through the data,
one would scroll right and left, in a horizontal fashion.
Measurement of key constructs
The methods employed for this study are quantitative. The dependent variables that were
analyzed are as follows:
1. Net income margin percentage
2. Low-reimbursing payor mix percentage
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The measure for analyzing profit margin will be net income margin percentage. It is a
more comprehensive variable compared to the other profit margin data points (total margin,
operating margin) because it accounts for taxes and interest and describes a more complete
picture of the hospital’s financial situation (Murphy, 2019). This is important when looking at
POHs and other for-profit hospitals because they pay property taxes and corporate income taxes.
Operating profit margin is a key performance indicator advocated by some (Maverick, 2018), but
it does not account for taxes and interest.
The measure for analyzing payor mix is percentage of payors from all possible options.
In the data set are nine insurance types: Medicare, Medi-Cal, private coverage, workers’
compensation, county indigent programs, other government, other indigent, self-pay, and other
payor. The insurance types will be grouped as follows: low reimbursing: Medi-Cal, county
indigent, other government, other indigent, self-pay, and other payor; high reimbursing:
Medicare and private coverage. Workers’ compensation was excluded.
Two independent variables which will be initially controlled for, based on the
independent variables available in the data sets from OSHPD, and which were controlled for in
the other studies, are hospital size (number of beds) and teaching status (Blumenthal, 2015 and
Plummer, 2016). In addition to controlling for hospital size and teaching status, other relevant
available independent variables from the data set will be reviewed using correlation analysis and
included in random effects regression models if they are statistically significant.
Data analysis and answering the research objectives
Describe the characteristics of hospitals in California. Data visualizations and analysis
will provide an overview of the characteristics of California hospitals as they relate to ownership
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type: physician owned, investor-owned, and non-profit. Descriptive statistics such as
frequencies, means and standard deviations will be computed for all study variables where
appropriate.
Empirically assess the profitability of physician-owned hospitals compared to other
hospitals in California for each year and over time. A one-way between groups analysis of
variance (ANOVA) will be used to compare the mean net income margin percentage between
POHs, investor-owned hospitals, and non-profit hospitals for each year between 2009 and 2015.
If statistically significant results are obtained, post-hoc analysis (i.e. Tukey and Scheffe), will be
used to determine the pairwise mean differences between the three hospital categories. This
analysis allows for more than two groups to be compared to each other while still isolating
statistically significant results. For this study, government hospitals were included with nonprofit
hospitals during the statistical calculations. The statistical analysis was run with government
hospitals as a separate category, but the results did not change.
Correlation analyses will be used to identify all variables that are correlated with net
income margin. Spearman correlation will be used for those variables that are dichotomous and
ordinal and Pearson for continuous variables. The variables that have statistically significant
correlation with net income margin will be used in the regression analysis. If a variable was
statistically significant in one year (2009-2015), it was included as a covariate to maintain
consistency.
A random effects regression model will be used with panel data and analyzed to
determine which independent variables are associated with the dependent variable net income
margin percentage. A random effects model is appropriate because it estimates the effect of both
time-invariant variables (hospital ownership) and time-variant variables (average length of stay
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etc.) have on net income margin percentage. Standardizing the coefficients will result in fewer
observations being included in the model. Non-profit hospitals will be used as the reference
variable, allowing POHs and investor-owned hospitals to be compared to them. Considering the
value of a coefficient assumes all other independent variables are being held constant. In a
random effects regression model, r-squared is used to measure goodness of fit. However, it is not
presented in this study because of a lack of credibility due to potential issues with
heteroskedasticity, endogeneity, clustering, autocorrelation, unit root testing, and omitted
variable bias etc. Multicollinearity is checked with the variance inflation factor (VIF).
A repeated measures ANOVA analysis will be conducted to determine if there are
differences in the net income margin percentage means over time between the three hospital
ownership types. This analysis contains tests for between subjects effects and pairwise
comparisons between groups. This test is appropriate because it includes time as a variable and
the effect can be measured as it relates to the different hospital groups.
Evaluate the payor mix of physician-owned hospitals compared to other hospitals in
California for each year and over time. A one-way between groups analysis of variance
(ANOVA) will be used to compare the mean low-reimbursing payor mix percentage between
POHs, investor-owned hospitals, and non-profit hospitals for each year between 2009 and 2015.
If statistically significant results are obtained, post-hoc analysis (i.e. Tukey and Scheffe), will be
used to determine the pairwise mean differences between the three hospital categories. This
analysis allows for more than two groups to be compared to each other while still isolating
statistically significant results. For this study, government hospitals were included with nonprofit
hospitals during the statistical calculations. As a sensitivity analysis the model was also run with
government hospitals as a separate category, but the results did not change.
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Correlation matrixes will be used to identify all variables that are correlated with lowreimbursing payor mix. Spearman correlation will be used for those variables that are normal and
ordinal and Pearson for continuous variables. The variables that have statistically significant
correlation with low-reimbursing payer mix will be used in the regression analysis. If a variable
was statistically significant in one year (2009-2015), it was included as a covariate to maintain
consistency.
A random effects regression model will be used with panel data and analyzed to
determine which independent variables are associated with the dependent variable lowreimbursing pay mix percentage. A random effects model is appropriate because it estimates the
effect of both time-invariant variables (hospital ownership) and time-variant variables (average
length of stay etc.) have on low-reimbursing pay mix percentage. Standardizing the coefficients
will result in fewer observations being included in the model. Non-profit hospitals will be used
as the reference variable, allowing POHs and investor-owned hospitals to be compared to them.
Considering the value of a coefficient assumes all other independent variables are being held
constant. In a random effects regression model, r-squared is used to measure goodness of fit.
However, it is not presented in this study because of a lack of credibility due to potential issues
with heteroskedasticity, endogeneity, clustering, autocorrelation, unit root testing, and omitted
variable bias etc. Multicollinearity is checked with the variance inflation factor (VIF).
A repeated measures ANOVA analysis will be conducted to determine if there are
differences in the low-reimbursing payor mix percentage means over time between the three
hospital ownership types. This analysis contains tests for between subjects effects and pairwise
comparisons between groups. This test is appropriate because it includes time as a variable and
the effect can be measured as it relates to the different hospital groups.
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Chapter 4: Results
The purpose of this chapter is to present the findings of the analysis conducted to answer the
research objectives. The following research objectives were the basis for the analysis conducted
during this study:
1. Describe the characteristics of hospitals in California
2. Empirically assess the profitability of physician-owned hospitals compared to other
hospitals in California for each year and over time.
3. Evaluate the payor mix of physician-owned hospitals compared to other hospitals in
California for each year and over time.
Research objective #1. Describe the characteristics of hospitals in California. The
number of POHs in California has changed over time and ranged from 8 to 11 (Table 4). Other
hospital ownership types have also changed over time, except for non-profits, which have
remained constant. The period between 2009 and 2010 saw the greatest change in the number of
POHs. The total number of hospitals has been very consistent between 530 and 531. POHs are
between 1.5% and 2% of all hospitals in California (Table 4).
Table 4
Frequency of Hospitals in the Sample by Ownership Type and Year

Physician-owned
Investor-Owned
Non-profit
Government
Total

2009
8
154
276
92
530

2010
11
153
277
90
531

2011
11
153
277
90
531
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2012
11
153
277
90
531

2013
10
154
277
90
531

2014
10
154
277
90
531

2015
10
154
277
89
530

The tables in Appendix B describe California hospitals in relation to each other in the
areas of patient payor mix, licensed beds, licensed beds occupancy rate, number of discharges,
net income margin percentage, and percent of operating budget for charity care. The hospitals
are grouped by ownership type. In the statistical analysis for this study, government hospitals are
combined with non-profit hospitals. The number of hospitals reporting data varies. More
hospitals report data relating to payor mix than do their characteristics or financial data.
From the tables in Appendix B, it is apparent that all hospitals rely heavily on Medicare
and private insurance as part of their payor mixes (combined, they comprise greater than 50% of
the payor mix). While other hospital ownership types remain relatively consistent, POHs have a
higher rate of variability (ranges from eight to 11). POHs have the lowest levels of charity care,
indigent patients, and the fewest number of beds.
This data from Appendix B, viewed graphically over time with trend lines (Figures 1-3),
indicates that net income margin percentage (one of the dependent variables) is positive for
POHs and investor-owned hospitals. However, the trend is negative for non-profit hospitals.
Combining the three figures (Figure 4), shows the greater variability in POH net income margin,
less variability for investor-owned hospitals, and relative stability (in a negative trend) for nonprofit hospitals. This might be explained by the relatively low number of POHs and high number
of non-profit hospitals.
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Figure 1
Net Income Margin Percentage Means for Physician-owned Hospitals, 2009-2015

Figure 2
Net Income Margin Percentage Means for Investor-owned Hospitals, 2009-2015
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Figure 3
Net Income Margin Percentage Means for Non-profit Hospitals, 2009-2015

Figure 4
Net Income Margin Percentage Means For All Hospitals, 2009-2015
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The second dependent variable, low-reimbursing payor mix percentage, shows a positive
trend for all hospital types. By combining the three charts (Figure 8), it is possible to see that
POH accept the fewest number of low-reimbursing patients (as a percentage of their payor mix)
compared to other hospitals. Investor-owned and non-profit hospitals have a similar payor mix
of low-reimbursing patients (Figure 8). Non-profit hospitals show the least amount of variability
in their low-reimbursing payor mix (Figure 7).
Figure 5
Low-Reimbursing Insurance Payor Mix Percentage Means for Physician-Owned Hospitals,
2009-2015
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Figure 6
Low-Reimbursing Insurance Payor Mix Percentage Means for Investor-owned Hospitals, 20092015

Figure 7
Low-Reimbursing Insurance Payor Mix Percentage Means for Non-profit Hospitals, 2009-2015
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Figure 8
Low-Reimbursing Insurance Payor Mix Percentage Means for All Hospitals, 2009-2015

The results of the data presented in this section indicate a higher level of variability
among POHs for the various variables. The data shows that POHs tend to have fewer beds, have
volatile net income margins, accept very few patients with indigent insurance, and overall accept
fewer patients with low-reimbursing insurance.
Research objective #2. Empirically assess the profitability of physician-owned hospitals
compared to other hospitals in California for each year and over time. The first statistical
analysis conducted to answer this research objective was a one-way between groups ANOVA.
Comparing the three hospital ownership groups to each other resulted in statistically significant
results in 2011, 2012, and 2014. Table 4 lists the p-values. Tukey and Scheefe post-hoc analyses
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confirms the results are significant in these years between investor-owned and non-profit
hospitals. There is no statistically significant between POHs and other hospital ownership types.
Table 5
One-Way Between Groups ANOVA Net Income Margin
Year
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014

POH N
5
7
8
8
7
7

Inv N
110
107
106
106
109
104

NP N
260
258
256
259
254
258

2015
7
106 256
Inv = investor, NP = non-profit
* p < .05, ** p < .01

Total POH Mean(SD) Inv Mean (SD) NP Mean (SD)
375 -1.31 (25.1)
2.74 (13.4)
1.93 (17.3)
372
6.63 (7.0)
5.12 (19.8)
3.00 (15.5)
370
1.42 (19.3)
8.06 (13.4)
3.26 (16.5)
373 14.06 (22.82)
8.36 (13.0)
2.84 (14.6)
370
2.59 (10.8)
1.21 (40.6)
2.52 (14.76)
369
6.89 (7.2)
7.58 (11.6)
2.62 (13.0)
369

2.45 (8.9)

6.91 (19.7)

0.28 (46.7)

F-value P-Value Multiple Comparison Tukey P-Value Scheffe P-Value
.20
.82
.72
.49
3.64
.03*
Inv, NP
.02*
.03*
7.32 .001**
Inv, NP
.003**
.004**
.10
.90
5.98 .003**
Inv, NP
.002**
.003**
1.01

.36

From the correlation analysis, statistically significant results are noted from the 2009
data (correlation matrices were generated for each year in the sample) in Appendix D. The
statistically significant variables relating to the dependent variable net income margin percentage
were included as covariates in the random effects regression model. The variables that were
included in the model from the correlation analyses are: teaching status (r = .13), licensed beds (r
= .11), licensed bed occupancy rate (r = .22), average length of stay (r = -.11), and charity
percentage of operating expenses (r = -.14).
The random effects linear regression model, reported in Table 6 indicates that several
independent variables are statistically significant and can predict the dependent variable net
income margin: investor-owned hospitals (b =.35, p < .001), licensed beds occupany rate (b =
.46, p < .001), and average length of stay (b = -.20, p < .001). The variable of most interest,
POH, is not associated with predicting the dependent variable. The results indicate that compared
to non-profit hospitals (reference variable), investor-owned hospitals are associated with an
increase in net income margin percentage by 35%. An increase in licensed beds occupancy rate
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by 1% increases net income margin percentage by 46%. Increasing the average length of stay by
1% decreases the dependent variable by 20%. The model is statistically significant with a VIF of
1.60.
Table 6
Random Effects Linear Regression Net Income Margin Percentage
Parameter
Constant
POH
Investor-owned Hospitals
Teaching Status
Licensed Beds Occupancy Rate
Average Length of Stay

Standardized Coefficient
-2.29
0.11
0.35
0.17
0.46
-0.20

Standard Error
0.11
0.08
0.08
0.15
0.08
0.04

z
-20.65
0.44
4.26
1.18
5.81
-4.92

p-value
< .001***
.66
< .001***
.24
< .001***
< .001***

Dependent variable: net income margin percentage
Observations = 1,872, groups = 448, statistically significant (prob > chi2 = 0.00)
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

For the repeated measures ANOVA, the descriptive data (Table 7) shows the mean net
income margin percentages for each hospital group. In 2009-2012, the POH mean is higher than
the other hospital groups. For 2013 and 2015, it is lower. In 2014 the mean net income margin
mean for POHs was between the other two hospital groups.
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Table 7
Net Income Margin Percentage Repeated Measures ANOVA Descriptives

Variable
Net Income Margin 2009

Net Income Margin 2010

Net Income Margin 2011

Net Income Margin 2012

Net Income Margin 2013

Net Income Margin 2014

Net Income Margin 2015

Ownership
POH
Investor
Nonprofit
Total
POH
Investor
Nonprofit
Total
POH
Investor
Nonprofit
Total
POH
Investor
Nonprofit
Total
POH
Investor
Nonprofit
Total
POH
Investor
Nonprofit
Total
POH
Investor
Nonprofit
Total

N
4
66
170
240
4
66
170
240
4
66
170
240
4
66
170
240
4
66
170
240
4
66
170
240
4
66
170
240

Mean
0.09
0.05
0.03
0.03
0.11
0.05
0.03
0.04
0.10
0.07
0.04
0.05
0.23
0.08
0.04
0.05
-0.04
0.05
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.08
0.02
0.04
-0.03
0.08
0.03
0.05

SD
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.0
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.3
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.1
0.2
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.2

The analysis of between-subjects effects and pairwise comparisons shows significant
results for the combination of investor-owned and non-profit hospitals. There is no association
between POHs and other hospital groups in this analysis. Analyzing each year of data in the
sample indicates no statistical significance between specific years. This analysis indicates that
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the net income margin percentage means are significantly different between investor-owned and
non-profit hospitals (p < .05). However, specific points in time are not statistically significant, f
(2, 237) = 14.39.
Table 8
Net Income Margin Percentage Repeated Measures ANOVA Results

Summary: This study attempts to determine if hospital ownership types are associated
with higher or lower net income margins. The random effects regression model shows that
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hospital ownership is not associated with net income margin percentage as far as POHs are
concerned. This may be due to the dependent variable not being normally distributed. Investorowned hospital ownership was associated with the dependent variable. There are not statistically
significant differences in the mean net income margin percentage between the different hospital
groups.
Research objective #3. Evaluate the payor mix of physician-owned hospitals compared
to other hospitals in California for each year and over time. The first statistical analysis
conducted to answer this research objective is a one-way between groups ANOVA. The results
indicate there is statistically significant differences in low-reimbursing payor mix between POH
and investor-owned hospitals (p < .05), and POH and non-profit hospitals in 2010, 2011, and
2012 (p < .05). This indicates that there are statistical differences between POHs and the other
hospitals groups in three years of the sample data. The p-values are listed below in Table 9, and
statistically significant results are noted.
Table 9
One-way Between Groups ANOVA Low-Reimbursing Insurance Payor Mix
Year
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

POH N
8
11
11

Inv N
154
153
153

NP N
368
367
367

11
10
10
10

153
154
154
154

367
366
367
367

Total POH Mean(SD) Inv Mean (SD) NP Mean (SD) F-value P-Value Multiple Comparison Tukey P-Value Scheffe P-Value
530 11.75 (24.5)
28.89 (29.3) 29.61 (26.0) 1.72
.18
531
7.39 (9.4)
29.46 (29.0) 30.49 (26.3) 3.96
.02* POH, Inv; POH, NP .02*, .01*
.03*, .02*
531
7.43 (10.1)
28.72 (29.9) 29.86 (27.1) 3.73
.03* POH, Inv; POH, NP .03*, .02*
.04*, .03*
531
530
531
531

7.94 (8.9)
20.05 (18.0)
21.20 (17.8)
21.37 (17.3)

31.10 (29.8)
29.13 (27.6)
30.97 (29.3)
32.19 (29.6)

30.67 (27.2)
31.22 (26.6)
31.65 (27.0)
33.33 (26.4)

3.87
1.09
0.74
0.99

.02*
.34
.48
.37

POH, Inv; POH, NP

.02*, .02*

.02*, .02*

Inv = investor, NP = non-profit

* p < .05

From the correlation analyses, statistically significant results are noted from the 2009
data (correlation matrixes were generated for each year in the sample) in Appendix D. The
statistically significant variables relating to the dependent variable low-reimbursing payor mix
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were included as covariates in the random effects regression model. The variables that were
included in the model from the correlation matrixes are: teaching status (r = .125), licensed beds
(r = .137), average length of stay (r = .140), and charity percentage of operating expenses (r =
.138).
The random effects linear regression model indicates that several independent variables
are associated with a lower reimbursement payor mix (Table 10). The variable of most interest,
POH ownership, is statistically significant meaning that it does predict low reimbursing payor
mix. The statistically significant variables are POH (b = -0.13, p = .02), and teaching status (b =
.14, p < .001). The coefficients show that if a hospital is categorized as a POH, low-reimbursing
payor mix is would go down by 13%. If a hospital is categorized as teaching, low-reimburing
payor mix is increased by 14%. The model is statistically significant and has a VIF of 1.28.
Table 10
Random Effects Linear Regression Low-Reimbursing Payor Mix Percentage
Parameter
Constant
POH
Investor-owned Hospitals
Teaching Status
Average Length of Stay

Standardized Coefficient
0.36
-0.13
-0.03
0.14
0.00

Standard Error
.0.1
0.05
0.02
0.04
0.01

z
p-value
24.68 < .001***
-2.44
0.02*
-1.58
.11
3.85
.001**
-0.45
.65

Dependent variable: low-reimbursing payor mix percentage
Observations = 2,591, groups = 467, statistically significant (prob > chi2 = 0.00)
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

For the repeated measures ANOVA, the descriptive data (Table 11) shows the mean
low-reimbursing payor mix for each hopsital group in each year. The low-reimbursing payor mix
for POHs is consistently below that of the other two hospital groups.
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Table 11
Low-Reimbursing Insurance Payor Mix Percentage Repeated Measures ANOVA Descriptives

Variable
Low Reimbursing Percentage 2009

Low Reimbursing Percentage 2010

Low Reimbursing Percentage 2011

Low Reimbursing Percentage 2012

Low Reimbursing Percentage 2013

Low Reimbursing Percentage 2014

Low Reimbursing Percentage 2015

Ownership
POH
Investor
Nonprofit
Total
POH
Investor
Nonprofit
Total
POH
Investor
Nonprofit
Total
POH
Investor
Nonprofit
Total
POH
Investor
Nonprofit
Total
POH
Investor
Nonprofit
Total
POH
Investor
Nonprofit
Total

N
11
153
366
530
11
153
366
530
11
153
366
530
11
153
366
530
11
153
366
530
11
153
366
530
11
153
366
530

Mean
0.15
0.29
0.30
0.29
0.07
0.29
0.30
0.30
0.07
0.29
0.30
0.29
0.08
0.31
0.31
0.30
0.20
0.29
0.31
0.30
0.21
0.31
0.32
0.31
0.19
0.32
0.33
0.33

SD
0.2
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.1
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.1
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.1
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.2
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.2
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.2
0.3
0.3
0.3

The between-subjects effects analysis indicates statistical significance (Table 13). This
means there is statistical significance when comparing the means of low reimbursing pay mix
percentage across the hospital ownership groups of POH vs investor-owned, and POH vs nonprofit hospitals (f [2, 527] = 3.89)(p = .02). However, when considering specific years in this
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analysis (2009-2015), the results are not statistically significant. The result shows that while
there are significant differences in the means, specific points in time are not significant between
the hospital ownership groups.
Table 12
Low-Reimbursing Insurance Payor Mix Percentage Repeated Measures ANOVA Results

Findings: This study attempts to determine if hospital ownership type is associated with
low-reimbursing insurance payor mix percentage. The regression model shows that the POHs
category is associated with the dependent variable while investor hospitals are not. The repeated
measures ANOVA confirms what was learned in the one-way between subjects ANOVA: POHs
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are significantly different than other hospitals groups. The repeated measures ANOVA was not
able to isolate significance between specific years in the sample.
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Chapter 5: Conclusions, Policy, Limitations, and Future Research
The purpose of this chapter is to consider the research objectves and how they relate to
the allegations against POHs and what was found in this study. This chapter will also suggest
what the findings mean for health policy. The limitations of this study will be discussed and
ideas for future research presented.
Conclusion
The first research objective, describing hospitals in California, shows that the ACA was
successful in restricting POHs in California. No new ones have opened and existing ones have
not expanded. This is consistent with the Plummer (2016) study which showed the same results
in Texas. How this study differs from the Plummer (2016) study is in the number of new POHs
that opened just prior to passage of the ACA. In California the number of POHs grew from eight
to 11. In Texas the POHs expanded by 20. The policy section of this chapter discusses an
appoach for allowing POHs to expand in ways that will minimize potential financial harm to
other hospitals.
The primary allegation against POHs that this study investigated was whether POHs in
California have cherry-picked or cream-skimmed patients, resulting in an advantageous payor
mix (third research objective). Furthermore, this study considered if the profitabilty of POHs was
different than other hospitals (second research objective). The data shows that POHs in
California from 2009-2015 have an advantageous payor mix that is statistically significant in
several years (2010-2012). The analysis is clear that POHs have a payor mix that is favorable
because they have fewer low-reimbursing insurance patients. This study did not attempt to
determine if the patients were healthier, only the type of insurance they carried. This conclusion
validates the allegation that POHs cherry-pick or cream-skim patients. This study did not attempt
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to determine if this advantageous payor mix was obtained by POHs intentionally. It simply exists
in the time period 2009-2015. These results are in contrast to the Blumenthal (2015) study which
found that POHs did not accept a significiantly lower number of patients with Medicaid.
Logically, an advantageous payor mix could result in higher profit margins (second
research objective). The results show that POHs do not have a statistically higher net income
margin compared to other hospitals. Having an advantagous payor mix would help achieve
higher profit margins. POHs may have disadvantages compared to other hospitals that prevent
them from achieving higher profit margins (location, size, services offered). These results create
tension because POHs appear to be taking advantage of the system by having such an
advantageous payor mix, while appearing benign because their profit margins are not higher than
other hospitals. In the Plummer (2016) study, Texas POHs post-ACA did very well financially,
much better than their non-POHs counterparts. In this study, POHs have not performed at a
financially higher level compared to other hopsital groups.
In conclusion, it is apparent that POHs occupy a very small portion of the hospital market
in California (objective one). Their payor mix is desirable (objective three), but they do not seem
to benefit financially from this advantageous payor mix (objective two). Policy makers should
consider these factors when determining how to proceed with legislation affecting POHs.
Policy
From the Conclusion section of this chapter, it is known that physician hospital
ownership (POHs) is associated with a statistically significant more advantageous payor mix.
POHs have a lower fraction of their payor mix from poorly paying sources. But this
advantageous payor mix does not benefit them consistently. Their net income margin is not
statistically different than other hospital ownership groups. If POHs did not exist in California,
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their advantagous patient payor mix would be transferred to other hospitals. The number of
POHs is so small, the other hospitals would not see any measurable improvements in their net
income margins.
POHs as a business model exist because of a loophole in the Stark law (the whole
hospital exception). The ability of physician hospital owners to take advantage of this opening in
California has not been successful during 2009-2015. One of the strengths POHs enjoy because
of their relatively small size is maneuverability in the marketplace. They can transition from
performing cardiac procedures to orthopaedic procedures quickly. But with ACA limitations,
they cannot expand. Thus POHs in California are benign under the current conditions.
The coefficients from the random effects regression model for net income margin
percentage indicate that compared to non-profit hospitals, investor-owned hospitals are
financially stronger. They further indicate that as the amount of charity care increases, the profit
margin decreases. The ACA’s requirement that non-profit hospitals provide community benefit
(or charity care) should be re-examined. It is incongruent that non-profit hospitals must provide
charity care while investor-owned hospitals do not, considering how much it impacts net income
margin percentage.
The coefficients from the random effects regression model for low reimbursing payor
mix indicate that as the percentage of charity care increases, so does the low reimbursing payor
mix. The result is similar to the previous paragraph where non-profit hospitals are disadvantaged
by having to provide charity care. As they continue to provide additional charity care (as
required by the ACA), their payor mix continues to deterioriate. Policymakers should consider
requiring all hospitals to provide a community benefit or charity care, and the amount should be
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specific. As the ACA is written, the value or level of community benefit is not specified. To
level the playing field, all hospitals should be treated equally in this regard.
The question for policymakers is what to do about the restrictions placed on POHs. If the
ACA falls in 2021 at the US Supreme Court, should policymakers continue these restrictions? If
the ACA survives in 2021, should the restrictions on POHs be reconsidered?
Policymakers should make changes such that the conflicts of interest inherant with POHs
(self-referral) are minimized. Physician owners should be permitted to own a small specialty
hospital, but at a reduced level of having less than a 25% stake. There is still an incentive for
profitability, but individual physician self-referral effects would be watered down. With
physician ownership capped at less than 25%, POHs should be permitted to expand and new
ventures opened. It is likely that POH partners would materialize from the for-profit and nonprofit sectors to fill out the ownership stakes in POHs. By encouraging POHs to partner with
other hospitals (investor-owned and non-profit), the challenges POHs face in providing
emergency and intensive care can be alleviated. If physicians want to open large comprehensive
hospitals, there should be no restrictions placed on this option. Large comprehensive hospitals
serve a vital community interest and face the same challenges as their investor-owned and nonprofit counterparts.
Study Limitations
A study is always limited by the data it uses for the analysis. Data from OSHPD is not
without fault. While hospitals are required to submit their data each year, not every hospital
complies to the same degree. For instance, Kaiser hospitals provided insurance payor mix data,
but not the financial variables data. These gaps in the data could have affected the results
because non-profit hospitals were underrepresented in this area. Depending on how well Kaiser
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hospitals performed financially, the mean net income margin for non-profit hospitals could have
gone up or down, affecting how POHs compared to them.
It is possible some POHs were missed when creating the groups to be studied. With the
number of POHs being relatively low, missing one or two hospitals could have impacted the
results.
Because POHs tend to be specialty hospitals that focus on a limited number of disease
states or procedures, it might have been beneficial to control for the severity of patient diagnosis
or case mix. This would help account for the differences in insurance payor mix or net profit
margin percentage between a comprehensive acute care hospital and a small specialty hospital
that only focuses on cardiac or orthopedic procesures. Unfortuantely this data was not a part of
the data set downloaded from OSHPD.
The statistical analysis shows what has happened to POHs pre-/post-ACA, but the results
cannot be directly attributed to the ACA. From the results, we cannot conclude that POHs have
performed better or worse, compared to the other hospital ownership types. If the ACA were to
fall, it cannot be known conclusively if POHs would dominate in the hea.thcare marketplace or if
they would remain in relative obscurity.
Further Research
As a study that is focused on providing useful results for policymakers, this study should
be repeated for the years 2016-2020 (when the data becomes available). The more recent the
results, the more useful it would be to those making policy decisions. Much has changed in the
healthcare arena since 2015, notably the COVID-19 pandemic. As each new year of data is
published by OSHPD, the results could be updated and made public to interested parties.
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There were statistically significant results in the repeated measures ANOVA for net
income margin percentage between investor-owned and non-profit hospitals. Comparing these
two groups in greater detail might yield results that are relevant to those that raise concerns about
whether non-profit hospitals should retain their non-profit status, or if investor-owned hospitals
are too concerned with profit and not enough with providing community benefit.
Results indicated that POHs had a smaller low reimbursing payor mix (significant in
2010, 2011, and 2012) compared to other hospitals. It is not known why this occurs. Are POHs
rejecting Medi-Cal patients? Do physicians not refer Medi-Cal patients to their POH facilities?
Or do they accept all patients and simply have fewer Medi-Cal patients seeking medical
treatment at their facilities? Are the locations of POHs in areas with few Medi-Cal patients?
The American Hospital Association annual survey contains an item asking if a hospital is
physician-owned. If this question were a requirement of the American Hospital Association
annual survey, or included in the OSHPD survey, it would aid further research as a more
definitive list of POHs could be established. It makes sense that if the law creates special
requirements for POHs, a list of POHs should be available to interested parties.
Adding a qualitative aspect to future studies could provide meaningful understanding to
what is happening to POHs in California. By interviewing POHs CEOs, context for the results
of the dependent variables could point researchers in new directions that help explain the results
of how POHs differ from investor-owned or non-profit hospitals.
In the literature review, other studies controlled for hospital size (licensed beds) and
teaching status in their linear regression models (Blumenthal, 2015 and Plummer, 2016). This
study indicates other variables should be considered as covariates: licensed beds occupancy rate,
and average length of stay. Controlling for these additional variables (if the data is available)
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can help narrow down the effect the main independent variable (hospital ownership) is having on
a given dependent variable.

55

References
AHA. (2016). Chartbook - Chapter 4: Trends in Hospital Financing. Retrieved from
https://www.aha.org/guidesreports/2016-08-31-chartbook-chapter-4-trends-hospitalfinancing
Andreb, H.-J. (2017). The need for and use of panel data. Retrieved from
https://wol.iza.org/uploads/articles/352/pdfs/the-need-for-and-use-of-panel-data.pdf
Belk, D. (2020). Hospital Financial Analysis. Retrieved from
https://truecostofhealthcare.org/hospital_financial_analysis/
Blumenthal, D. M., Orav, E. J., Jena, A. B., Dudzinski, D. M., Le, S. T., & Jha, A. K. (2015).
Access, quality, and costs of care at physician owned hospitals in the United States:
observational study. BMJ, h4466. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.h4466
Cole, C. (2013). Physician-Owned Hospitals and Self-Referral. AMA Journal of Ethics, 15(2),
150–155. https://doi.org/10.1001/virtualmentor.2013.15.2.hlaw1-1302
Congress. (2003). Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003.
Retrieved from https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-108publ173/pdf/PLAW108publ173.pdf
Congress. (2017). Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. Retrieved from
https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/hr1/BILLS-115hr1enr.pdf
Elflein, J. (2019). Number of hospitals by ownership type U.S. 2009-2017. Retrieved from
https://www.statista.com/statistics/203003/number-of-hospitals-in-the-us-by-ownershiptype/
GAO. (2003). Specialty Hospitals: Information on National Market Share, Physician Ownership,
and Patients Served. Retrieved from https://www.gao.gov/assets/100/91815.pdf

56

Howe, A. (2020). Justices Grant Affordable Care Act Petitions. Retrieved from
https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/california-v-texas/
King, E., and Engelhardt. (2020). In the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Retrieved from http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/19/19-10011-CV0.pdf
LaPointe, J. (2020). Top-Earning Non-Profit Hospitals Offer Less Charity Care. Retrieved from
https://revcycleintelligence.com/news/top-earning-non-profit-hospitals-offer-less-charitycare
Leavitt, M. (2005). Study of Physician-Owned Specialty Hospitals Required in Section 507(c)(2)
of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003.
Retrieved from https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Fraud-andAbuse/PhysicianSelfReferral/Downloads/RTC-StudyofPhysOwnedSpecHosp.pdf
Levinson, D. (2008). Physician-Owned Specialty Hospitals’ Ability to Manage Medical
Emergencies. Retrieved from https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-02-06-00310.pdf
Liptak, A. (2012). Supreme Court Upholds Health Care Law, 5-4, in Victory for Obama.
Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/29/us/supreme-court-lets-health-lawlargely-stand.html
Liu, J. B., & Kelz, R. R. (2018). Types of Hospitals in the United States. JAMA, 320(10), 1074.
https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2018.9471
Manchikanti, L., McMahon, E. (2007). Physician Refer Thyself: Is Start II, Phase III and Final
Voyage? Pain Physician 200, 10:725-741
Masterson, L. (2017). CBO reports shows private insurers pay physicians, hospitals far more
than Medicare. Retrieved from https://www.healthcaredive.com/news/cbo-reports-showprivate-insurers-pay-physicians-hospitals-far-more-than-m/445949/

57

Maverick, J. (2018). Key Financial Ratios in Analyze Healthcare Stocks. Retrieved from
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/active-trading/082015/key-financial-ratiosanalyze-healthcare-industry.asp
Mcaskill, R. (2014). Examining Differences Between Medicare, Medicaid Reimbursement.
Retrieved from https://revcycleintelligence.com/news/examining-differences-medicaremedicaid-reimbursement
McCarthy, R. L., Schafermeyer, K. W., & Plake, K. S. (2012). Introduction to health care
delivery: A primer for pharmacists. Sudbury, MA: Jones & Bartlett Learning.
Murphy, C. (2019). Net Profit Margin. Retrieved from
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/net_margin.asp
Musumeci, M. (2020). Explaining Texas v. U.S.: A Guide to the Case Challenging the ACA.
Retrieved from https://www.kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/explaining-texas-v-u-s-aguide-to-the-case-challenging-the-aca/
O’Connor, R. (2018). In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas Forth
Worth Division. Retrieved from https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5629711Texas-v-US-Partial-Summary-Judgment.html
OIG. (1989). Financial Arrangements Between Physicians and Health Care Businesses.
Retrieved from https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oai-12-88-01410.pdf
Plummer, E., & Wempe, W. (2016). The Affordable Care Act’s Effects On The Formation,
Expansion, And Operation Of Physician-Owned Hospitals. Health Affairs, 35(8), 1452–
1460. https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2015.1342

58

Rowan, H. B. (2019). Charity Care Spending By Hospitals Plunges. Retrieved from
https://medicarereport.org/index.php/2019/08/13/charity-care-spending-by-hospitalsplunges/
Service, I. R. (2012). Title 26 – Internal Revenue Code Chapter 48 Maintenance of Minimum
Essential Coverage. Retrieved from https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE2011-title26/pdf/USCODE-2011-title26-subtitleD-chap48-sec5000A.pdf
Shi, L., & Singh, D. A. (2019). Essentials of the U.S. health care system. Burlington, MA: Jones
& Bartlett Learning.
Steinwald, B. (2006). Operational and Clinical Changes Largely Unaffected by Presence of
Competing Specialty Hospitals. Retrieved from
https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06520.pdf
Strokoff, S. (2010). Compilation of Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Retrieved from
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ppacacon.pdf
Taylor, M. (2006). California’s Health Care Districts. Retrieved from https://www.chcf.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/12/PDF-CaliforniasHealthCareDistricts.pdf
Trybou, J., De Regge, M., Gemmel, P., Duyck, P., & Annemans, L. (2014). Effects of PhysicianOwned Specialized Facilities in Health Care: A Systematic Review. Retrieved from
https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/25305719/
Yood, K., Grushkin, J., and Goldman, M. (2019). Update to Texas v. United States: Fifth Circuit
Strikes Individual Mandate, Remands on Severability. Retrieved from
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/update-to-texas-v-united-states-fifth-circuitstrikes-individual-mandate-remands

59

Appendix A
Table A1
All Variables Available in the Dataset
Variable
Hospital Owneship Type
Teaching Status
Low-Reimbursing Insurance Payor Mix
High Reimbursing Insurance Payor Mix
Licensed Beds
Licensed Beds Occupancy Rate

Type
Available or Computed
Categorical
Available
Categorical
Available
Continuous
Computed
Continuous
Computed
Continuous
Available
Continuous
Available

Available Beds
Available Beds Occupancy Rate
Patient Days
Discharges
Average Length of Stay
Gross Patient Revenue
Deductions from Revenue
Capitation Premium
Net Patient Revenue
Other Operating Revenue
Total Operating Revenue
Operating Expenses
Net from Operations

Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous

Available
Available
Available
Available
Available
Available
Available
Available
Available
Available
Available
Available
Available

Non-Operating Revenue
Non-Operating Expense
Income Taxes
Extraordinary Items
Net Income
Current Ratiol
Days in Accounts Receivable
Long-Term Debt to Net PPE
Long-Term Debt to Equity
Equity to Total Assets
Net Return on Total Assets
Patient Revenue Margin
Operating Margin
Total Margin
Net Income Margin
Cost-to-Charge Ratio
Net PPE Per Licensed Bed
Charity-Other
Charity-Other + Bed Debt
Charity-Other + Bed Debt + CIP
Charity % of Operating Exp
Charity + Bad Debt + CIP Adj % of Op Exp
ER Visits
Clinic Visits
Home Health Visits
Referred O/P Visits
I/P Surgeries
O/P Surgeries
Purchased I/P Days

Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous

Available
Available
Available
Available
Available
Available
Available
Available
Available
Available
Available
Available
Available
Available
Available
Available
Available
Available
Available
Available
Available
Available
Available
Available
Available
Available
Available
Available
Available
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Appendix B
Table B1
Hospital Characteristics by Ownership Type, 2009

Number of Hospitals Reporting
Patient payor mix %
Medicare
Med-Cal
Private
County Indigent
Other Government
Other indigent
Self-Pay
Other Payer
Hospital Characteristics
Number of Hospitals Reporting
Licensed Beds
Licensed Beds Occupancy Rate %
Financial Characteristics
Number of Hospitals Reporting
Net Income Margin %
Charity % of Operating Expenses

Physician-owned
7
Mean (SD)
39.47 (18.2)
11.58 (25.7)
35.46 (23.7)
0.18 (0.3)
0.19 (0.2)
0 (0)
1.27 (1.5)

Investor-owned
128
Mean (SD)
38.85 (28.1)
24.82 (24.5)
21.02 (20.6)
2.84 (10.3)
3.38 (14.8)
0.26 (0.7)
2.17 (2.7)

Non-profit
250
Mean (SD)
33.24 (20.6)
19.71 (17.2)
34.05 (20.3)
0.93 (2.8)
3.31 (13.0)
0.24 (0.8)
3.32 (5.9)

Government
90
Mean (SD)
30.37 (26.0)
27.59 (22.6)
14.53 (15.3)
4.98 (13.8)
4.49 (14.5)
0.39 (1.5)
4.51 (5.4)

0.13 (0.2)

1.07 (3.3)

0.43 (2.4)

0.58 (2.9)

5
98.2 (55.1)
60.54 (16.2)

110
179.71 (143.9)
59.44 (18.2)

5
-1.31 (25.1)
1.89 (0.9)

110
2.74 (13.4)
1.36 (1.8)

61

74
186
224.14 (193.4) 206.65 (150.3)
60.17 (18.6)
57.81 (16.5)
186
1.93 (17.5)
1.69 (1.6)

74
2.78 (11.6)
1.61 (2.0)

Table B2
Hospital Characteristics by Ownership Type, 2010

Number of Hospitals Reporting
Patient payor mix %
Medicare
Med-Cal
Private
County Indigent
Other Government
Other indigent
Self-Pay
Other Payer
Hospital Characteristics
Number of Hospitals Reporting
Licensed Beds
Licensed Beds Occupancy Rate %
Financial Characteristics
Number of Hospitals Reporting
Net Income Margin %
Charity % of Operating Expenses

Physician-owned
10
Mean (SD)
44.58 (17.8)
4.40 (7.5)
37.35 (23.2)
0.57 (0.7)
0.59 (0.7)
0.06 (0.2)
2.25 (1.8)

Investor-owned
127
Mean (SD)
37.46 (26.2)
24.91 (23.2)
21.23 (20.6)
3.07 (11.0)
2.68 (11.8)
0.40 (1.1)
3.05 (5.3)

Non-profit
250
Mean (SD)
32.67 (18.1)
19.81 (17.0)
32.60 (20.0)
0.85 (1.7)
3.48 (13.0)
0.28 (0.9)
3.35 (5.7)

Government
88
Mean (SD)
26.38 (22.0)
28.98 (22.4)
13.1 (13.3)
6.51 (15.8)
4.03 (13.2)
0.36 (1.3)
4.93 (6.2)

0.09 (0.2)

1.03 (3.5)

0.45 (2.2)

1.39 (10.4)

9
70.44 (132.3)
39.92 (23.4)

107
116.86 (98.7)
58.67 (19.7)

9
4.49 (7.7)
0.22 (0.3)

107
4.84 (19.7)
1.31% (1.7)

62

63
193
222.15 (197.7) 195.88 (211.6)
58.87 (17.7)
58.67 (15.5)
193
3.00 (15.5)
1.87 (2.0)

63
1.21 (7.1)
2.06 (3.1)

Table B3
Hospital Characteristics by Ownership Type, 2011

Number of Hospitals Reporting
Patient payor mix %
Medicare
Med-Cal
Private
County Indigent
Other Government
Other indigent
Self-Pay
Other Payer
Hospital Characteristics
Number of Hospitals Reporting
Licensed Beds
Licensed Beds Occupancy Rate %
Financial Characteristics
Number of Hospitals Reporting
Net Income Margin %
Charity % of Operating Expenses

Physician-owned
9
Mean (SD)
48.09 (16.4)
5.13 (8.5)
38.12 (20.4)
0.20 (0.4)
0.87 (1.1)
0.16 (0.4)
2.34 (2.0)

Investor-owned
114
Mean (SD)
40.06 (25.5)
27.60 (23.0)
20.86 (18.9)
3.83 (12.4)
1.93 (9.1)
0.43 (1.2)
3.27 (5.2)

Non-profit
236
Mean (SD)
34.93 (17.1)
21.20 (17.4)
34.04 (18.3)
1.00 (1.9)
3.60 (13.0)
0.27 (0.8)
3.61 (5.7)

Government
71
Mean (SD)
31.40 (21.1)
32.28 (19.1)
15.06 (13.1)
8.06 (16.9)
4.39 (12.3)
0.28 (0.9)
6.22 (6.6)

0.19 (0.6)

1.27 (3.7)

0.59 (2.8)

1.91 (11.9)

10
64.40 (95.5)
36.47 (23.5)

106
155.41 (97.7)
61.02 (20.4)

10
1.42 (19.3)
0.18 (0.3)

106
8.06 (13.4)
1.45 (1.7)

63

62
192
258.62 (200.3) 188.15 (180.2)
58.35 (18.1)
56.29 (16.4)
192
3.26 (16.5)
1.96 (1.7)

62
4.22 (7.2)
2.08 (3.4)

Table B4
Hospital Characteristics by Ownership Type, 2012

Number of Hospitals Reporting
Patient payor mix %
Medicare
Med-Cal
Private
County Indigent
Other Government
Other indigent
Self-Pay
Other Payer
Hospital Characteristics
Number of Hospitals Reporting
Licensed Beds
Licensed Beds Occupancy Rate %
Financial Characteristics
Number of Hospitals Reporting
Net Income Margin %
Charity % of Operating Expenses

Physician-owned
10
Mean (SD)
45.26 (20.2)
4.67 (7.9)
35.80 (20.9)
0.05 (0.1)
0.71 (1.0)
0.11 (0.3)
2.16 (1.7)

Investor-owned
121
Mean (SD)
39.53 (25.3)
28.51 (24.0)
20.49 (18.9)
3.34 (11.5)
1.97 (7.2)
0.44 (1.1)
3.46 (5.6)

Non-profit
238
Mean (SD)
35.28 (17.3)
21.48 (17.4)
32.91 (18.2)
1.13 (2.5)
3.32 (12.0)
0.37 (1.1)
3.52 (5.6)

Government
73
Mean (SD)
33.02 (20.2)
31.19 (17.5)
14.89 (12.7)
6.96 (13.2)
4.88 (12.7)
0.26 (0.6)
6.38 (5.9)

0.23 (0.5)

1.38 (4.0)

1.43 (7.4)

2.03 (11.9)

10
64.40 (95.5)
35.62 (23.0)

106
158.16 (99.4)
59.38 (19.6)

10
14.06 (22.8)
0.15 (0.3)

106
8.36 (13.0)
1.26 (1.5)

64

61
196
256.81 (198.8) 192.20 (183.5)
56.31 (18.1)
55.35 (16.7)
196
2.84 (14.6)
2.09 (1.8)

61
0.80 (6.9)
2.11 (3.5)

Table B5
Hospital Characteristics by Ownership Type, 2013

Number of Hospitals Reporting
Patient payor mix %
Medicare
Med-Cal
Private
County Indigent
Other Government
Other indigent
Self-Pay
Other Payer
Hospital Characteristics
Number of Hospitals Reporting
Licensed Beds
Licensed Beds Occupancy Rate %
Financial Characteristics
Number of Hospitals Reporting
Net Income Margin %
Charity % of Operating Expenses

Physician-owned
9
Mean (SD)
47.41 (16.7)
15.66 (15.1)
29.60 (16.1)
1.90 (2.9)
0.58 (0.5)
0.26 (0.7)
3.01 (1.7)

Investor-owned
124
Mean (SD)
40.47 (25.1)
24.13 (20.3)
22.16 (18.9)
4.03 (11.0)
3.61 (12.3)
0.55 (2.3)
0.63 (1.9)

Non-profit
234
Mean (SD)
35.64 (18.4)
23.80 (18.5)
29.06 (18.5)
2.34 (8.7)
2.82 (10.5)
0.32 (0.9)
3.98 (6.3)

Government
77
Mean (SD)
34.37 (20.5)
27.99 (21.6)
22.28 (17.8)
3.61 (7.1)
4.08 (13.1)
0.55 (2.1)
4.85 (5.2)

0.73 (1.8)

0.64 (1.9)

1.29 (8.1)

1.29 (4.1)

9
225.56 (234.3)
62.16 (18.0)

111
177.14 (141.2)
57.56 (19.7)

9
2.59 (10.8)
1.08 (1.3)

111
1.21 (40.6)
1.29 (1.6)

65

64
188
227.90 (189.5) 231.92 (191.4)
55.33 (19.8)
53.34 (17.5)
188
2.52 (14.8)
2.07 (2.0)

64
3.16 (17.0)
1.79 (2.1)

Table B6
Hospital Characteristics by Ownership Type, 2014

Number of Hospitals Reporting
Patient payor mix %
Medicare
Med-Cal
Private
County Indigent
Other Government
Other indigent
Self-Pay
Other Payer
Hospital Characteristics
Number of Hospitals Reporting
Licensed Beds
Licensed Beds Occupancy Rate %
Financial Characteristics
Number of Hospitals Reporting
Net Income Margin %
Charity % of Operating Expenses

Physician-owned
9
Mean (SD)
46.81 (15.9)
20.16 (17.1)
28.97 (16.2)
0.10 (0.1)
0.69 (0.5)
0.02 (0.0)
1.85 (1.0)

Investor-owned
122
Mean (SD)
38.42 (24.7)
30.16 (23.6)
21.28 (18.4)
1.57 (6.5)
3.62 (13.3)
0.46 (3.0)
2.61 (3.9)

Non-profit
235
Mean (SD)
35.07 (17.7)
27.71 (19.7)
28.88 (18.2)
0.43 (3.1)
2.67 (10.1)
0.08 (0.4)
3.02 (6.0)

Government
75
Mean (SD)
33.73 (19.3)
35.16 (25.6)
22.23 (17.2)
0.69 (2.4)
2.68 (6.8)
0.08 (0.3)
3.62 (4.7)

0.59 (1.6)

0.80 (2.2)

1.34 (8.1)

1.31 (4.8)

9
217.22 (229.5)
61.64 (16.7)

105
184.89 (143.9)
58.51 (18.8)

9
6.89 (7.2)
0.75 (1.0)

105
7.58 (11.6)
0.99 (1.3)

66

62
194
223.75 (180.1) 226.63 (185.8)
56.02 (20.4)
53.28 (17.8)
194
2.62 (13.0)
1.68 (1.8)

62
5.76 (9.2)
1.19 (1.3)

Table B7
Hospital Characteristics by Ownership Type, 2015

Number of Hospitals Reporting
Patient payor mix %
Medicare
Med-Cal
Private
County Indigent
Other Government
Other indigent
Self-Pay
Other Payer
Hospital Characteristics
Number of Hospitals Reporting
Licensed Beds
Licensed Beds Occupancy Rate %
Financial Characteristics
Number of Hospitals Reporting
Net Income Margin %
Charity % of Operating Expenses

Physician-owned
9
Mean (SD)
47.27 (15.5)
20.31 (16.5)
28.29 (15.2)
0.02 (0.0)
0.75 (0.5)
0.02 (0.0)
1.86 (1.0)

Investor-owned
122
Mean (SD)
38.78 (24.8)
32.56 (24.8)
19.96 (17.4)
1.15 (3.6)
3.64 (13.3)
0.31 (2.7)
2.07 (3.8)

Non-profit
241
Mean (SD)
35.35 (18.3)
29.27 (20.9)
27.81 (18.2)
0.50 (4.5)
3.06 (12.0)
0.09 (0.4)
2.16 (3.6)

Government
76
Mean (SD)
32.70 (20.1)
37.49 (26.5)
20.89 (17.1)
1.13 (5.3)
0.60 (2.1)
2.40 (7.3)
0.16 (0.7)

0.61 (1.7)

0.73 (2.4)

1.02 (5.3)

3.51 (6.7)

9
212.56 (221.8)
61.85 (13.0)

107
183.77 (140.9)
85.11 (254.3)

9
2.44 (8.9)
0.47 (0.5)

107
6.91 (19.7)
0.67 (1.0)

67

64
190
220.52 (176.0) 228.59 (190.4)
53.49 (21.2)
54.69 (17.5)
190
0.28 (46.7)
1.13 (1.3)

64
(8.10) (89.0)
2.31 (9.5)

Appendix C
Table C1
Kruskal-Wallis H Test Net Income Margin, 2009-2015
Year
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

POH N Inv N NP N Total POH Median
5
110 260 375
4.79
9
10
10
9

107
106
106
109

256
254
257
252

Inv Median
3.15

NP Median
2.89

Statistic P-Value Multiple Comparison P-Value
0.24
.89

372
370
373
370

6.95
4.48
3.84
1.69

6.39
7.74
7.89
6.58

3.44
4.25
3.93
4.15

5.68
9.81
14.09
8.04

.06
.01* Inv, NP
.001** Inv, NP
.02* Inv, NP

.002**
< .001***
.005**

2014
9
104 256 369
2015
9
107 254 370
Inv = investor, NP = non-profit
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

4.76
5.42

8
7.51

3.28
4.58

14.36
9.64

.001* Inv, NP
.008** Inv, NP

< .001***
.002**

Kruskal-Wallis H Test Low-Reimbursing Insurance Payor Mix, 2009-2015
Year
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

POH N
8
11
11
11
10
10
10

Inv N
154
153
153
153
154
154
154

NP N
368
367
367
367
366
367
367

Total POH Median
530
3.15
531
3.82
531
2.63
531
6.67
531
15.06
531
16.73
531
17.11

Inv Median
23.15
25.19
22.43
26.69
25.86
24.84
26.95

NP Median
24.7
26.86
26.3
27.23
27.78
28.27
30.97

Inv = investor, NP = non-profit
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

68

Statistic P-Value Multiple Comparison
5.48
.07
8.81
.01* POH, Inv; POH, NP .01*, .002**
8.72
.01* POH, NP
.003**
7.8
.02* POH, Inv; POH, NP .03*, .003**
2.37
.31
1.66
.44
2.34
.31

Appendix D
Table D1
Correlation Matrix, 2009
Variable
Teaching Status Low Reimbursing Payer Mix Licensed Beds
Teaching Status
1
.125**
.147**
Low Reimbursing Payer Mix
.125**
1
0.008
Licensed Beds
.147**
0.008
1
Licensed Beds Occupancy Rate
0.074
0.073
0.093
Average Length of Stay
-0.042
0.002
-0.151**
Net Income Margin
0.031
-0.067
0.039
Charity % of Operating Expenses
0.052
.138**
.232**
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level,
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level

Licensed Beds Occupancy Rate Average Length of Stay Net Income Margin Charity % of Operating Expenses
0.074
-0.042
0.031
0.052
0.073
0.002
-0.067
.138**
0.093
-0.151**
0.039
.232**
1
.208**
0.133**
-0.036
.208**
1
-0.73
-.171**
0.133**
-0.073
1
0.065
-0.036
-.171**
0.065
1
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